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SUM OF YOUR PARTS: ARE THERE ADEQUATE REMEDIES
FOR VICTIMS OF FRAUDULENT TISSUE AND ORGAN
ACQUISITION?
Azza Jayaprakash
I. INTRODUCTION
It seems unthinkable to reduce a human being to the sum of his parts -
his organs, tissue, and cells. It seems even more distasteful to quantify
the value of these parts. However, these are the decisions that face
health care providers, researchers, legislatures, and society as the
market for human organs and tissue grows. This is not simply a matter
of black market trade in organs for desperate (and well-connected)
recipients. Recent cases have shown that respected biotechnology
companies may also become involved in the illegal acquisition of
cadavers or organs and tissue from patients who consent only to
surgery or laboratory tests, not the use of their harvested tissue for
scientific or commercial research by third parties.1 Once third parties
acquire such tissue-perhaps without knowledge of its unsavory
origins-current law allows them to profit from their research without
surrendering any compensation to patients or their families.
2
What happens when a biotechnology company unknowingly
develops new technology from fraudulently acquired organs? What
remedies are available to the families of victims when this company
makes a huge profit from this technology and the accompanying
patents and licenses? These questions are not merely hypotheticals. In
2004, it was discovered that employees of the University of California
at Los Angeles ("UCLA") Willed Body Program3 were dismembering
donated cadavers and selling organs and other tissues to medical
research companies. 4 One of these companies was pharmaceutical
1 Andrew Murr, Bad News For the Body Trade: A Cash For-Corpses Scheme at
UCLA Horrifies Families, NEWSWEEK, March 22, 2004, at 42; see Dan Majors, You
Can't Have Too Many Eyes, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, February 10, 2005, at A13.
2 Moore v. Regents of University of California, 51 Cal.3d 120, 159 (Cal. 1990)
(quoting 1 Harper et al., THE LAW OF TORTS § 2.34, at 234 (2d ed. 1986)).
3 The Willed Body Program is a program through which cadavers are donated to
medical schools for use in anatomy classes. UCLA Willed Body Program Fact Sheet,
http://www.ucla.edu/willedbody/factsheet.html (last visited April 21, 2006).
4 Mul, supra note 1, at 42.
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giant Johnson and Johnson. Most disturbing are allegations that
UCLA administrators were not simply lax in their oversight, but knew
and tacitly approved of this lucrative "tissue bazaar." 6 Fortunately, this
misconduct was discovered, but how many other cases go undetected or
unreported? How many victims and families of victims exist? How
have courts and legislatures responded to this dilemma? Victims and
their families turning to the existing legal framework for protection
may find only pale shelter under the current legal regime.
The legal community must search for new and better ways to
deter and regulate such activities, and ensure just compensation for
victims and families violated by those who fraudulently acquire organs
and tissue. As researchers continue to push the frontiers of medical
science, it will become even more critical to strike a balance between
stronger legal scrutiny of transactions involving human organs and
tissue and allowing biotechnology companies the freedom to develop
lifesaving technologies without excess red tape.
This article will not consider the morality or economics of
transactions involving organs and tissue. Rather, this article will
confine itself to exploring past and present remedies available to
victims and families of victims defrauded by improper organ
acquisition. It will focus on several regimes: intellectual property law,
tort law, property law, and business ethics. This article also seeks to
expose conflicting views within these regimes, and propose new
remedies for victims.
II. BACKGROUND: HISTORICAL LACK OF REMEDIES FOR
ORGAN AND TISSUE THEFT
Historically, there have been very few causes of action available
for the victims of fraudulent acquisition of organs. These claims are
usually confined to mishandling of cadavers. In the past, families
have had a cause of action for mishandling of cadavers under theories
of negligence or negligent infliction of emotional distress. 8 Some
5Id.
6 Jeffrey Kluger, The Body Snatchers, TIME, March 22, 2004, at 49.
7 Charles M. Jordan, Jr. & Casey J. Price, First Moore, Then Hecht: Isn't It Time We
Recognize A Property Interest In Tissues, Cells, And Gametes?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 151, 172 (2002) [hereinafter Jordan & Price].
8 Marla K. Clark, Solving The Kidney Shortage Crisis Through The Use Of Non-
Heart-Beating
Cadaveric Donors: Legal Endorsement Of Perfusion As A Standard Procedure, 70
IND. L.J. 929, 943 (1995).
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states have specifically made cadaver tampering a tort, or created
criminal penalties for tampering with tissues and organs.9 Minnesota,
for instance, has created a cause of action for interference with the legal
right to the possession of the corpse for purposes of preservation and
burial. 10 However, these statutes impose liability only on the person
who directly mistreats or mishandles the organs, not to third parties
who subsequently possess the organs." Furthermore, due to informed
consent and liability waivers, hospitals often have limited or no liability
regarding mishandling or misappropriation of organs and cadavers. 12
As a result, living patients have found even less legal support to
recover damages when tissues and organs have been improperly
acquired in a hospital setting. In the benchmark case, Moore v. Regents
of California, the plaintiff was convinced by his doctor to have surgery
under false pretenses so that his doctor could acquire the plaintiffs
tissue for his own lucrative research. 12  The Supreme Court of
California found against the plaintiff, pointing to the public policy
implications of allowing a patient to retain property rights in tissue
removed during surgery. The Court thus concluded that organs
removed during surgery should be considered abandoned property;
accordingly, the plaintiffs conversion claim was unsuccessful because
he had no property interest in his own cells. 14  However, the court
upheld the plaintiff's argument that the acquisition and use of his cells,
9 See ARK. CODE ANN § 5-60-101; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-312; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52 (defining a corpse as property for the
purposes of theft claims).
10 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 390.21; see Sworski v. Simons, 208 Minn. 201, 205, 293 N.W.
309, 311 (1940) (discussing Larson v. Chase, .47 Minn. 307).
" See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-101; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-312; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52 (defining a corpse as property for the
purposes of theft claims).
12 See Mark S. Nadel & Caroline A. Nadel, Using Reciprocity To Motivate Organ
Donations, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHIcs 293, 301 (2005) [hereinafter Nadel
& Nadel]; UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 11 (1987) ("a hospital, physician,
surgeon, [coroner], [medical examiner], [local public health officer], enucleator,
technician, or other person, who acts in accordance with this [Act] or with the
applicable anatomical gift law of another state [or a foreign country] or attempts in
good faith to do so is not liable for that act in a civil action or criminal proceeding.").
12 Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 124-25.
13 Id. at 135 ("[i]n effect, what Moore is asking us to do is to impose a tort duty on
scientists to investigate the consensual pedigree of each human cell sample used in
research. To impose such a duty, which would affect medical research of importance
to all of society, implicates policy concerns far removed from the traditional, two-
party ownership disputes in which the law of conversion arose.").
14 Id. at 153-54 (citing Judge Broussard's dissenting opinion).
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tissue, and other bodily substances was a breach of fiduciary duties on
the part of his physician. 
1 5
Even though Moore presented a partial victory for the plaintiff,
many other controversies remained. Although it protected research
from the legal hindrance of property disputes, was it fair to effectively
strip patients of property interests in their own organs and tissue?
What remedies remained other than breach of fiduciary interest after
this case? Who should be held liable in such cases?
As to the last question, the court answered that there was no
liability for conversion of tissues and cells distributed to third party
researchers. 16 Under the particular circumstances presented in Moore,
the court held that if the treating physician disclosed economic and
research interests that may affect his judgment, plaintiff could not
support claims for breach of fiduciary duty or failure to obtain informed
consent. 17 However, third party defendants could be held vicariously
liable based on the acts of the treating physician.' 8
Although there was some disagreement over Moore's holding
on policy grounds, it was certainly a predictable extension of a long
line of case precedent on property interests in cadavers.1 9 For example,
in Holsen v. Heritage Mutual Insurance, the court held that there is no
property interest in a cadaver. 20  Furthermore, in Ramirez v. Health
Partners of South Arizona, the court held that the common-law claim
for negligent interference with a dead body does not extend to the
organ donation context.21
"5 Id. at 152-53 (citing Judge Broussard's dissenting opinion).
161d. at 143.
17 Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 147.
18 Id. at 147. See infra Part III.A.3.b.
19 See, e.g., Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property
Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 238-39 (1990); Jennifer Lavoie, Note,
Ownership of Human Tissue: Life After Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, 75 VA. L. REV. 1363 (1989).
20 Holsen v. Heritage Mutual Insurance, 165 Wis. 2d 641, 478 N.W.2d 59 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1991).
21 Ramirez v. Health Partners of Southern Arizona, 193 Ariz. 325, 333, 972 P.2d 658,
666 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
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III. CURRENT REMEDIES FOR FRAUDULENTLY ACQUIRED
ORGANS AND TISSUE
A. Tort-Based Remedies
This section includes an in-depth discussion of the various available
tort claims for fraudulently acquired organs and tissues, including
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence.
1. Conversion
In tort claims for the fraudulent acquisition of organs and tissues, the
issue of whether a property interest exists in organs and tissues is a
recurring barrier encountered by plaintiffs. Precedent establishing that
plaintiffs have been unable to claim a property interest under tort law
has dramatically impacted the damages that plaintiffs may recover.
22
Case law suggests that plaintiffs may not recover damages under a
theory of conversion based on a property interest in cadavers and
23organs. Indeed, conversion claims have often been rejected in the
context of human organs and tissue in several jurisdictions, including
24the Moore v. Regents decision. However, a growing number of
scholars are pushing for courts to rethink the holding in Moore.25 In
United States v. Arora, a Maryland district court applied the tort of
conversion to the misappropriation of human tissue lines, concluding
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 cmt. a (1979). In the absence of a
conversion claim, patient's families must usually rely upon the tort claim called
interference with dead bodies. Damages for this claim stem from injuries resulting
from mental distress. Id.
23 Id. Although the basis of the tort claim interference with a dead body is a quasi-
property interest in the body, the drafters of the Restatement did not consider corpses
property because traditionally they can not be transferred or sold. Several courts
have rejected conversion claims involving corpses. See Perry v. St. Francis Hosp. &
Medical Center, 865 F.Supp. 724, 726, 728 (1994); Culpepper v. Pearl Street Bldg.,
877 P.2d 877, 880-882, 884 (1994).
24 Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 147.25 See generally Charlotte H. Harrison, Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative
Models for Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 77
(2002) (exploring the financial discrepancy in human organ commerce and noting
researchers and biomedical companies gross substantial profits from body products of
human donors, but the donors rarely see any of these proceeds); Donna M. Gitter,
Ownership Of Human Tissue: A Proposal For Federal Recognition Of Human
Research Participants' Property Rights In Their Biological Material, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 257, 270 (2004); see generally Jordan & Price, supra note 7, at 151.
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that human cell lines are indeed property. 26 In Hecht v. Superior Court,
the court held there was property interest in sperm for the purpose of
inheritance. 27 Unfortunately, these cases are the rare exception to the
vast majority of cases which have held the opposite. 28
Assuming arguendo that courts upheld such a conversion claim,
third party beneficiaries may still avoid liability. 28  Established
conversion law permits a "subsequent innocent converter" to retain the
financial benefit of work expended on the stolen property. 29 As Moore
demonstrates, medical researchers and drug manufacturers are free to
reap the economic fruits of research from fraudulently acquired organs
and cadavers.
30
2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Breach of fiduciary duty provides another cause of action. However,
the reach of such claims is limited as patients may only recover from
defendants that are subject to a fiduciary duty, namely their own
physicians. 3' Patients may not recover from a biotechnology company
or from a physician-researcher who is not treating the patient under this
claim. 32 Although third-party corporations might be liable under
respondeat superior, this view has been looked upon with considerable
skepticism since it is often the case that a principal-agent relationship
exists between physicians and corporate defendants.
33
Courts and scholars alike have acknowledged the dearth of
remedies against third parties who benefit from the acquisition of
organs.34 However, it is up to legislatures to remedy this void, since
26 United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Md. 1994), affd, 56 F.3d 62 (4th Cir.
1995).
27 Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.App.4th 836, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that probate court held jurisdiction over decedent's property interest in
his cryogenically preserved sperm).
28 See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute, 264 F.Supp.2d
1064, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (refusing find a property interest for the body tissue and
genetic information); Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 149; Perry, 886 F.Supp. at 1563;
Culpepper, 877 P.2d at 883.
28 Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 159 (citing Judge Broussard's dissenting opinion).
29 Id. (citing 1 Harper et al., THE LAW OF TORTS § 2.34, at 234 (2d ed. 1986)).
30 Id.
31 See Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 129.
32 Id. at 133.
33 Id. at 181-182 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 175 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Dr. Thomas H. Murray: "[i]f
biotechnologists fail to make provision for a just sharing of profits with the person
1240 [VOL.9.3:1235
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our legal framework does not impose clearly-defined duties on
pharmaceutical or biotechnology corporations for research on cadavers
and organs.
35
3. Negligence
a) Negligence Claims For Failure to Inform
Although courts are far more willing to accept negligence claims than
other tort claims for misappropriation and mishandling of organs and
cadavers, there are several obstacles and restrictions that make it
difficult for plaintiffs to recover damages. Plaintiffs must clear two
hurdles to recover. 36 First, plaintiffs must establish a causal
connection between their injury and the physician's failure to inform. 38
Specifically, plaintiffs must demonstrate that if they had been fully
informed, they would have declined to consent to the procedure in
question.
Second, plaintiff must also prove that no reasonably prudent
person would have given consent had he been properly informed. 3
Several jurisdictions focus on this stringent "objective" standard. 38
Although this standard allows courts to avoid depending on the
patient's biased and highly-subjective perspective on whether, in
hindsight, they would have consented, this standard establishes a very
heavy burden for plaintiffs to satisfy. 39 Regardless, negligence claims
for failure to inform do not extend to third party corporations that come
into possession because they have no duty or other relationship with the
victim. 4
°
whose gift made it possible, the public's sense of justice will be offended and no one
will be the winner.").
" Id. at 178.37 Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 179.
38 See id. at 179; Martin & Lagod, Biotechnology and the Commercial Use of Human
Cells: Toward an Organic View of Life and Technology, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH L.J. 211, 222 (1989); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 245 (Cal. 1978).
37 Cobbs, 8 Cal.3d. at 245.
38 See Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz.App. 358, 370, 409 P.2d 74, 86 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1965); Sharpe v. Pugh, 270 N.C. 598, 604-05, 155 S.E.2d 108, 113 (N.C. 1967); cf
Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 673 (Mo. 1965).
39 2 Louisell & Williams, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 22.14, at 22-50, 22-51 (1989).
40 See Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 133. Because corporations, as non-physician entities, have
no fiduciary duty to patients, they may escape liability for breach of fiduciary duty. Id.
20061
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b) Vicarious Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress
Plaintiffs may only recover for damages caused by emotional distress
from anyone "who intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes,
withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body of a dead person or
prevents its proper interment or cremation.', 41  Lawmakers have
purposefully avoided making this a property-based tort claim, as
evidenced by the comments of drafters of the Second Restatement of
Torts:
This [claim] does not, however, fit very well into the
category of property, since the body ordinarily cannot be
sold or transferred, has no utility and can be used only for
the one purpose of interment or cremation. In practice the
technical right has served as a mere peg upon which to
hang damages for the mental distress inflicted upon the
survivor; and in reality the cause of action has been
exclusively one for the mental distress.42
An essential element of negligence is that the defendant owes a
duty of care to the plaintiff.43 Third party corporations often do not
assume any duty related to patient services. It would therefore appear
that corporations could escape liability for negligent infliction of
emotion distress. However, plaintiffs may sue under the theory that a
corporation negligently purchased human organs or should have known
that the transaction violated federal and state laws that prohibit the sale
44of human organs.
In Pool v. City of Oakland, the court held that a defendant may
be found liable where that defendant induced another to act in
circumstances under which it was foreseeable that the conduct would
cause injury to a third party.45 Similarly, in Christensen v. Superior
Court, the court reasoned that "[i]f the likelihood that a third person
41' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1977); see R. Alta Charo, Skin And
Bones: Post-Mortem Markets In Human Tissue, 26 NOVA LAW REVIEW 421, 428
(2002).
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 cmt. a (1977).
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 4 cmt. b (1965) (discussing the definition of duty
in the context of negligence).
44 Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868, 891-892, 820 P.2d 181, 194, 2
Cal.Rptr.2d 79, 92 (Cal. 1991).
45 See Pool v. City of Oakland, 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1073, 232, Cal.Rptr. 528, 728 P.2d
1163 (Cal. 1986).
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may react in a particular manner is a hazard which makes the actor
negligent, such reaction whether innocent or negligent does not prevent
the actor from being liable for the harm caused thereby. ',46  Thus,
plaintiffs may hold corporations vicariously liable on a theory that it
encouraged or induced the unlawful conduct of another.47
This joint enterprise theory is a well-established exception to
the general rule that does not attribute liability for the negligence of
another:
48
[B]efore the courts will find that the parties were joint
adventurers there must be clear evidence of a community of
interest in a common undertaking in which each participant
has or exercises the right of equal or joint control and
direction. A joint venture is sort of a mutual agency, akin
to a limited partnership. It is not sufficient that the parties
have certain plans in common, but the community of
interest must be such that [each] is entitled to be heard in
the control [of the enterprise]. Most of the cases indicate
that the common interest must be of some business
nature.49
In Christensen v. Superior Court, the court examined whether a
research company could reasonably foresee that its conduct in offering
to buy substantial quantities of human organs and body parts from
defendant crematory operators would induce those defendants to
obtain the organs and body parts in a manner that causes extreme
emotional distress to the decedent's relatives. 50 Accordingly, the court
held that if the research company should have foreseen that the
46 Christensen, 54 Cal.3d at 892 (quoting Weirum v. RKO General, 15 Cal.3d 40, 47,
123 Cal.Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975)). See also Clark v. Library of Congress,
750 F.2d 89, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (where defendant induced violation of plaintiffs
civil rights).
47 Id. at 892 (citing 5 Harper et al., THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.1, at 3 (2d ed. 1986)); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302(b) (1965) ("[an act or an omission may be
negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of
harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third person which is intended
to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal.").
48 See PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS § 72, at 516-521 (5th ed. 1984).
49 Roberts v. Craig, 124 Cal.App.2d 202, 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954); see also King v.
Ladyman, 81 Cal.App.3d 837, 843, 146 Cal.Rptr. 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); DeSuza v.
Andersack, 63 Cal.App.3d 694, 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); 6 Witkin, SUMMARY OF
CAL. LAW § 1008, at 399-400 (9th ed. 1988).
50 Christensen, 54 Cal.3d at 893.
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crematory defendants would violate the law, then the research
company would be found negligent per se.
51
B. Remedies under Intellectual Property Law and Unjust
Enrichment from Fraudulently Acquired Organs and Tissue
1. The Commoditization of Organs, Cells, and Tissues
As discussed above, the courts have been unwilling to view organs and
tissue as property for the tort of conversion. 52 However, in the context
of organ donations, courts and legislatures have created property rights
that do not otherwise exist. 53 For instance, the Ohio Anatomical Gift
Law suggests that the donor has a property right to her organs before
death, which transfers to the donee upon the execution of the statutorily
approved instruments or upon death.54  This conflict is observed in
several state organ donation statutes. 55 However, courts have refused
to extend these property rights in the context of tort-based claims.
56
Yet, biomedical and biotechnology companies heavily invest in human
organs and tissue in order to obtain their own intellectual property
rights. 57 This conflict between regimes allows corporations to be
51 lid.
52 See Greenberg, 264 F.Supp.2d at 1074; Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 149; Perry, 886
F.Supp. at 1563; Culpepper, 877 P.2d at 880-882.
53 See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-145 (Georgia's anatomical gift act allows donees to
transfer, escheat, and revoke anatomical gifts; see OHIO REV. CODE § 2108.02(f)
(2003) ("donee has a property right in an anatomical gift donated"); OR. REV. STAT. §
97.954 (stating that the donee has the power to give or revoke an anatomical gift by
written instrument); Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, cert. denied 116
S.Ct. 476, 516 U.S. 975, 133 L.Ed.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1995), on remand 941 F.Supp.
1483 (relatives had constitutionally protected property interest in corpse, under
common law right to possess relative's body for the purposes of burial and to prevent
mutilation of body and state Anatomical Gift Act, which gave relatives the right to
make a gift of all or part of decedent's body).
54 Melissa A. W. Stickney, Property Interests In Cadaverous Organs: Changes to
Ohio Anatomical Gift Law And The Erosion Of Family Rights, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 37,
43 (2003).
55 See generally GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-140 (instead of 140, article 6) (Georgia's
anatomical gift act allows donees to transfer, escheat, and revoke anatomical gifts; see
OHIO REV. CODE § 2108.02(f) (2003) ("donee has a property right in an anatomical
gift donated"); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.954 (stating that the donee has the power to give
or revoke an anatomical gift by written instrument).56 Ramirez, 193 Ariz. at 333.
57 Michele Goodwin, Altruism's Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ Commodification,
56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 360 (2004).
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unjustly enriched from fraudulently acquired organs, while patients are
unable to recover under traditional property law or patent law. 
58
The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO")
once barred the patenting of cells and tissue for many of the same
policy reasons that prevent patients from having property rights in their
organs.59 Currently, cells, DNA, and microorganisms are patentable if
they have been genetically engineered or modified from their natural
states.
60
The number of patents involving DNA, cells, and
transplantation technology has grown astoundingly. Children's Hospital
of Boston owns patents that cover growing organs in vivo. 61  The
University of Missouri owns a patent that covers not simply cloning
technology, but potentially a cloned human being. 62 Another
biotechnology company owns a patent which covers "stem cells
containing a genetic sequence that allows the undifferentiated cells to
be specifically eliminated, leaving the differentiated cells
unaffected.", 63  The prevalence of this research is evidence of the
common use of cell, tissues, and organs in research, and the tacit
acceptance of this research by the USPTO. This tacit acceptance may
" Id. at 326 ("[t]issues may be harvested absent consent, and sometimes after
denial."); Ramirez, 193 Ariz. at 333; Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 136-37 (plaintiffs cells
were obtained by his physician under false pretenses and patented; however, plaintiff
was not able to recover under a conversion claim, and had no remedy under patent
law); but see Christopher Scott Pennisi, More On Moore: A Novel Strategy For
Compensating The Human Sources Of Patentable Cell-Line Inventions Based On
Existing Law, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 747, 750 (2001)
(suggesting that patients whose cell lines have been used in the development of
patented cell lines, may be compensated under patent law's shop right doctrine).
9 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 307-08, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980). In
addition to statutory barriers, Courts often rejected the idea of patenting living
creatures on moral and ethical grounds. Id.
60 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-310; U.S. Patent No. 6,855,543 (issued February 15,
2005).
61 Virginia Baskerville, Patents Cover Technology to Grow Organs In Vivo,
TRANSPLANT NEWS NETWORK (July 15, 1998), available at
http://www.centerspan.org/tnn/98071504.htm (last visited April 22, 2006).
62 Kristen Philipkoski, Why Does School Own Clone Patent?, WIRED NEWS (May 16,
2002), available at
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0%2C 1 282%2C52610%2C00.html (last
visited April 22, 2006); see also U.S. Patent No. 6,211,429 (issued April 3, 2001).
63 Geron Receives U.S. Patent for Pluripotent Stem Cells Modified for Therapeutic
Applications, BUSINESS WIRE (June 10, 2003), available at
http://www.mcpf.org/displayarticle.asp?articleld=174 (last visited April 22, 2006);
see U.S. Patent No. 6,800,480 (issued October 5, 2004).
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perhaps encourages this research and further fuels the commoditization
of cells, organs, and tissues. Unfortunately, despite technology
flourishing in this field, the demand for organ transplants has well
exceeded the supply.
64
Patent law provides inventors with a government-sponsored
monopoly in these technologies and, at times, the cells and modified
genetic materials themselves. Unfortunately, patent law does not
provide many punitive measures or civil remedies for patent inventions
developed using stolen biological materials. 65  Still, there are a few
unconventional ways in which patients may attack the validity of such
patents.
66
2. Constitutional Arguments for Invalidating Patents on
Inventions Involving Genetic Materials
The Fourteenth Amendment grants citizens the power to control
reproduction. 67 Patent applications are published, and all of the
information therein is released to the public domain. 68 If the patent
covers modified DNA, the public may have access to a portion of
someone's DNA which could then be synthesized and propagated in a
cell line. 69 Where an invention involves the propagation of
fraudulently acquired organs, cells, and DNA, plaintiffs may argue that
granting a patent will indirectly infringe on the plaintiffs Fourteenth
Amendment reproductive rights because government approval of the
patent makes it complicit in the release of genetic information in
violation of the plaintiff s reproductive rights.7 °
64 Nadel & Nadel, supra note 12, at 293.
65 Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 136-37 (plaintiffs cells were obtained by his physician under
false pretenses and patented; Greenberg, 264 F.Supp.2d at 1074 (refusing to find a
property interest for the body tissue and genetic information, where patients with the
Canavan disease donated blood samples to researchers who discovered the Canavan
gene, and then secretly patented and restricted the availability of testing).
66 For complete discussion see section B.2.
67 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
68 35 U.S.C § 122 (generally, all applications are published in the USPTO Gazette 18
months after filing).
69 See generally Molecular Cloning,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNA-cloning#Molecular (generally describing methods
for synthezing and incorporating a DNA sequence into a vector).
70 Cf Paul Lesko & Kevin Buckley, Attack Of The Clones ... And The Issues Of
Clones, 3 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 1, 1 (2002) (discussing whether bans on
cloning may be held unconstitutional on the ground that they infringe reproductive
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Such a patent grant appears to violate the Due Process Clauses
of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments which prohibit state and
federal governments from depriving an individual's "life, liberty or
property without due process of law.' The Fourteenth Amendment
embraces the right to control reproduction. 72 The Fourteenth
amendment prohibits the government from compelling or facilitating
the compulsion of reproduction. In turn, the right to control
reproduction falls under the greater umbrella of the Fourteenth
Amendment right to privacy.74 Thus, the release of a patient's genetic
information infringes upon both the right to privacy and, potentially,
the right to control reproduction.
3. The Tainted Research Doctrine
Another remedy lies in an equitable doctrine referred to by one scholar
as the tainted research doctrine. The tainted research doctrine allows
Courts to invalidate the patent for an invention that was the result of
research involving theft, criminality, or scientific fraud. 75 For example,
if a plant is illegally acquired and a new drug or novel gene is isolated,
developed, patented, and sold using this sample, the patent could be
held unenforceable as the product of "tainted research. 76 In Regents of
the University of California v. Eli Lilly, university researchers violated
rights); see Arti Rai, Remarks at the Meeting of the President's Council on Bioethics,
Session 6, Regulation 4: Patentability of Human Organisms 2: Ethics and Public
Policy (June 20, 2002), available at
http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/jun02/june21session6.html (last visited April 22,
2006); Richard Guerra, Therapeutic Cloning As Proper Subject Matter For Patent
Eligibility, 43 IDEA 695, 712 (2003).
71 U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
72 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113; Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Eisenstadt, 405
U.S. 438 (1972).
73 See generally Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Katharine Ip et al., Plaintiffs Opposition Reply To
Defendant Dolly's Motion For Summary Judgment, 35 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 1051, 1070
(2002).
74 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("[i]f the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child."); Ip, supra note 77, at 1070.
75 See Michael A. Gollin, Dwindling natural resources have spurred tighter
regulations for biodiversity prospecting, 17 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 921 (1999),
available at
http://www.venable.com/publication.cfn?action=view&publication-id=892&publicat
ion.type-id=2 (last visited April 24, 2006).
76 See id.
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National Institutes of Health ("NIH") regulations prohibiting the use of
uncertified plasmids in mammalian recombinant DNA research, and
developed cDNA encoding human insulin using these plasmids. 77 In
their patent application, these researchers then falsely indicated that
they had used a certified plasmid.78
The lower court invalidated the patent on a theory of patent
fraud. 79 However, the appeals court reversed, concluding that the
misstatements were not "material" to examination of the patent
application. 80 One scholar believes that the case teaches us that
although inventions based on tainted research might result in a claim of
fraud, 81 a patent will only be unenforceable if misrepresentations are
material to the inventor's patent application. 
82
Although not generally accepted, the tainted research doctrine
could be applied in the context of research involving fraudulently
acquired tissue and organs if the USPTO considered the disclosure of
the origin of genetic sources and biological samples "material" or
required such information for patent applications. However, this
would constitute a major paradigm shift in patent prosecution. 84
Currently, patent applicants are not required to provide the origin of
genetic resources, organs, or tissues.85 However, this could change as a
result of the United Nations Convention for Biological Diversity.
4. International Treaties: The Convention on Biological Diversity
The international intellectual property community has become
increasingly alarmed at instances of biotechnology corporations that
acquire and patent traditional knowledge from aboriginal cultures
77 Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225 (S.D. Ind.
1995), rev'd in pertinent part, 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
78 id.
79 Id. at 1569.
'0Id. at 1571.
81 See Gollin, supra note 79.
82 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (stating that the inventor has a "duty to disclose to the [USPTO]
all information known that individual to be material to patentability" (emphasis
added)).
83 Gollin, supra note 79; 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (listing all of information applicants must
disclose).
84 37 C.F.R. § 1.56. Although the USPTO requires disclosure of prior art, it does not
require disclosure of genetic resources. Id.
85 Id.
86 See Gollin, supra note 79.
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without providing just compensation or recognition for such
knowledge. 87 Scholars and the press often call this phenomenon
"biopiracy." 88 In 1993, the United Nations Convention on Biological
Diversity ("CBD") was convened in order to open an international
dialogue and facilitate treaties to prevent biopiracy. 89 Currently, the
USPTO does not require that applicants indicate the origin of genetic
resources or biological material. However, it is common practice for
natural product patents to identify the country from which biological
material was obtained in order to satisfy the patent enablement
requirement. 91
The European Parliament attempted to adopt a measure
requiring patent aplicants to disclose a biological material's
geographical source. The European Commission eventually rejected
the Parliament's proposal because it was more restrictive than the CBD
requirements. 93 However, if such a proposal were ever adopted, then
nondisclosure of source country would invalidate the patent.
9
Under the proposed rules of the CBD, there are several
consequences for misrepresentation of the origin of genetic materials,
including weak patents; liability for profit sharing claims; 95 consumer
boycotts; barriers to importation of biotechnology products; and loss of
market share.
96
Under the proposed CBD regulations, if a researcher illegally
removes biological material from a source or source country and profits
from this material, the source or source country could recover all or
some of the profits based on a theory of misappropriation. 97  Also,
under the CBD, legal title to biological material can only be acquired if
87 Id.
88 Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure Of The Origin Of Genetic Resources
And Prior Informed Consent In Patent Applications Without Infringing The Trips
Agreement: The Problem And The Solution, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 371, 375
(2000).
89 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992.
90 See Nancy Kremers, Speaking With A Forked Tongue In The Global Debate On
Traditional Knowledge And Genetic Resources: Are U.S. Intellectual Property Law
And Policy Really Aimed At Meaningful Protection For Native American Cultures?,
15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 9 (2004); 37 C.F.R. 1.56.
91 See Gollin, supra note 79.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 See id.
9' See id.
96 See Gollin, supra note 79.
9' See id.
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the sample was legitimately obtained with informed consent from a
source. If there is no legal title, the collector of an illegitimate
sample will not be able to legitimately transfer this sample to
colleagues, partners, or third parties for experimentation. 99 Moreover, if
a supplier falsely declares under contract that it properly obtained a
sample, then the recipient may collect damages for breach of contract
from the person who collected the sample.'
1 00
C. Remedies under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act
1. RICO Violations Stemming from Patent Fraud
If a corporation has developed and patented technology using
misappropriated organs and tissues, the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act may be another source of
relief. 101 RICO Act claims are not isolated to claims involving
organized criminal activity 02 Under the RICO Act, successful
plaintiffs may collect treble damages and attorneys fees. 103 If plaintiffs
can establish that a corporation repeatedly participated in illegal
commercial transactions involving organs, then those plaintiffs may
recover under the RICO Act. 104
Civil RICO complaints have been filed based on mail or wire
fraud, including cases involving patent fraud. 10 5 The USPTO requires
patent applicants to disclose all known documents relevant to earlier
patents and publications concerning similar inventions. 106 If a patent
applicant fails to disclose relevant documents during the original
examination, this may constitute patent fraud. 107 Because patent
applicants often send patent application documents to the USPTO via
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 See id.
01 Steven Fasman, The Proper Application Of Civil Rico To Patent Fraud, 96 YALE
L.J. 1323 (1987).
102 See Cecil Greek, Is This the End of RICO? Or Only the Beginning?: The Ongoing
Debate Over The Expanded Use Of Criminal And Civil Rico, 19 FREE INQUIRY IN
CREATIVE SOCIOLOGY 11 (1991), available at http://www.fsu.edu/-crimdo/rico.html
(last visited April 27, 2006).
103 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
104 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3331.
105 Id.
106 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1448; 37 CFR 1.56.
107 Id.
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mail, patent fraud could be used to prove the mail fraud requirement
under RICO.10 g
Although RICO claims have rarely been upheld in the context
of patent law, the Court sustained the plaintiffs RICO claim based on
the prolonged pattern of defendant's misconduct in Lemelson v. Wung
Labs. 109 However, if the USPTO adopts the CBD guidelines
(discussed supra in Part III.B.4) requiring the disclosure of the genetic
resources' and biological materials' origins as a prerequisite for patent
applications, this may open the door to many more patent fraud cases
under the RICO Act. I0
2. RICO Claims Stemming from Illegal Transactions Involving
Human Organs
In cases involving the fraudulent acquisition of cadavers and organs,
RICO claims may be predicated on grounds other than patent fraud."'
The RICO Act defines racketeering as "any act which is indictable"
under Title 18, sections 1957, 2314 and 2315. 112 Section 1957
prohibits monetary transactions in property derived from specified
unlawful activity. 113 The National Organ Transplantation Act
criminalizes human organ transactions, prohibiting anyone from
knowingly acquiring, receiving, or otherwise transferring "any human
organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the
transfer affects interstate commerce."
1 14
108 Using mail to perpetrate a fraud is the predicate act required for mail fraud. See
Greek, supra note 106.
Patent law requires those applying for a patent to collect and send to
the patent office by mail all documents related to previous patents
for similar inventions. Failure to provide such documents during the
original examination can constitute fraud if the current patent holder
can prove the admissibility and relevance of prior patents thought to
be known to the applicant. Since the mails are used in the
application process, patent fraud can be applied as the RICO
predicate of mail fraud and triple damages plus attorney's fees
sought.
Id.
'
09 Lemelson v. Wung Labs, 874 F. Supp. 430 (D. Mass. 1994).
110 See Gollin, supra note 79 (discussing the CBD and patent disclosure requirements).
... See 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
112 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
113 18 U.S.C. § 1957.
114 See National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (prohibiting the sale of
human organs).
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Because Sections 2314 and 2315 prohibit interstate
transportation of stolen property and the National Organ
Transplantation Act prohibits interstate transactions involving organs,
plaintiffs may be able to substantiate a RICO Act claim for the
interstate sale of organs. 115 In a RICO claim courts will need to
determine whether organs can be considered property. In the interest of
justice, the answer must be found in the state's Organ Donation Acts,
which vest patients and family members with a quasi-property interest
in organs and cadavers. 1
6
D. BUSINESS ETHICS, SEC VIOLATIONS, AND THE POWER
OF SHAREHOLDERS
1. Business Ethics
Corporate liability must also be viewed from the perspective of
business ethics and policy. In the wake of the Enron scandal, there has
been a new call for business ethics and corporate accountability. 117
Shareholders and the public are demanding a greater amount of
responsibility on the part of corporations. 118 Accordingly, there must
be more diligence in assuring that organs are legitimately acquired. ' 19
Both the government and the public expect and demand more
from biotechnology
corporations, premised on the prominent role they play in our health
care system. 1  These corporations have increased incentives for due
diligence in the acquisition of organs, 121 since failing to exercise due
diligence in confirming the sources of organs and tissue 122 may result
"' See 18 U.S.C. § 2314, 2315.
116 See generally Stickney, supra note 58.
117 See Katherine S. Mangan, Accrediting Board Endorses Stronger Focus on Ethics
in Business-School Curriculums, The Chronicle of Higher Education, available at
http://chronicle.com/daily/2003/01/2003010805n.htm (last visited April 26, 2006).
118 See id.
119 See id.
120 See generally Gregory N. Mandel, Confidence-Building Measures For
Genetically Modified Products: Stakeholder Teamwork On Regulatory Proposals, 44
JURIMETRICS J. 41 (2003) (discussing the importance of consumer trust for
biotechnology companies).
121 See Gollin, supra note 79.
122 See Class Action America Online, UCLA's Willed Body Program Under Fire for
Allegedly Allowing the Sale of Human Body Parts, available at
http://www.classactionamerica.com/public/caselndex.aspx?lngCaselD=3268 (last
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in millions of dollars in litigation costs and awards. 123 Moreover, the
loss of good will can be devastating to the financial viability of a
company in the aftermath of such scandals.' 
24
2. Securities Fraud and Shareholders' Derivative Suits
It is also important to acknowledge the power of shareholders in
examining corporate liability and schemes to fraudulently acquire
organs. This is not simply a crime against the victim and his family, it
is a wrong perpetrated against society and, indirectly, shareholders. In
2003, shareholders of transplant company Cryolife filed a shareholders
derivative suit, stemming from Cryolife's mishandling of cadavers,
which led to the deaths of heart valve and knee tissue transplant
recipients.125 According to plaintiffs, Cryolife assured its shareholders
and the investing public that "patient safety was its paramount concern"
and that Cryolife was in compliance with FDA regulations. 126
However, in one instance, a 23 year-old man who underwent elective
knee surgery died as a result of an allograft127; the allograft, which was
manufactured and sold by Cryolife, had been contaminated with
bacteria from the bowel of a cadaver donor.'
28
The shareholders' complaint alleges that defendants violated
"Rules 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule lOb-5.. .by issuing materially false and misleading statements
regarding quality control problems in [Cryolife's] processing of human
visited April 26, 2006) (describing pending class action against UCLA and Johnson &
Johnson for mishandling of cadavers from UCLA's Willed Body Program).
123 See The Law Offices of Berman DeValerio Pease Tabacco Burt & Pucillo, Case
Information, http://bermanesq.com/Securities/CasePage.asp?caseid=451 (last visited
April 27, 2006) (describing a shareholders' derivative suit filed against Cryolife
alleging that the corporation violated FDA regulations and mishandled cadavers).
124 See Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility: What It Might Mean, If
It Were Really To Matter, 71 IOWA L. REv. 557, 567 (1986).
125 See InterNet Bankruptcy Library, CRYOLIFE INC.: Berger & Montague
Commences Securities Suit in N.D. GA, CLASS ACTION REPORTER (August 30, 2002),
available at http://bankrupt.com/CARPublic/020830.mbx (last visited April 27,
2006).
126 See id.
127 Allograft, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allograft ("[a]n allograft is a
transplanted organ or tissue from a genetically non-identical member of the
same species.").
128 See Keenan Law Firm, Cryolifelitigation.com,
http://www.cryolifelitigation.com/bio.asp (last visited April 27, 2006).
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tissues and heart valves that had the effect of artificially inflating the
market price of [Cryolife's] securities." 129
Plaintiffs allege that Cryolife knowingly made false statements,
and "demonstrated a pattern of nondisclosure or severe reckless
disregard with respect to its disclosures to shareholders and regulatory
edict.' "3 The shareholders seek damages for all persons and entities
who purchased stocks between April 2, 2001 and August 14, 2002.131
As a result of this litigation, Cryolife's image has been negatively
impacted, and the company has incurred significant litigation fees.
1 32
This may also set an important precedent for the power of shareholders
to influence corporate policy on human tissue transactions. 1
33
3. Corporate Incentives to Comply with FDA Regulations and
Statutes Regarding Handling of Cadavers and Organs
The consequences of mishandling cadavers are not restricted to
lawsuits against the company. 134 The most profound and devastating
consequences may be the effect on investors' confidence in the stocks
of those companies. 135  For instance, after a CDC investigation,
Cryolife admitted in a press release that it gave a patient an infected
heart valve, which resulted in a serious infection and removal of the
patient's infected heart valve. 136 Following these disclosures, the
impact of the market reaction was devastating 137 as the market price of
CryoLife's common stock "dropped from a high of almost $45 per
129 See InterNet Bankruptcy Library, supra note 129.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See CryoLife to settle shareholder lawsuit stemming from 2002 Recall,
http://www.onlinelawyersource.com/news/cryolife-settle-lawsuit.html. Cryolife
settled the shareholder lawsuit for 23.5 million dollars. Id. The lawsuit involving the
death of the recipient of a contaminated Cryolife allograft has been settled for an
undisclosed amount. Id. Although the FDA has now lifted its limitations on
Cryolife's sales, in 2002, the FDA sent out warnings surgeons to not use Cryolife's
heart valves. See Sandra Blakeslee, Surgeons Are Warned About Heart Valves, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2002, at A15; Company News: Cryolife Renews Deal Allowing Sale
Of Human Tissue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2003, at C4.
133 See id.
134 See InterNet Bankruptcy Library, supra note 129; See The Law Offices of Berman
DeValerio Pease Tabacco Burt & Pucillo, supra note 127 (describing a shareholders'
derivative suit filed against Cryolife alleging that the corporation violated FDA
regulations and mishandled cadavers).
135 See InterNet Bankruptcy Library, supra note 129.
136 See id.
137 See id.
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share..., and from $23.66 per share just before the disclosure to as low
as $2.03 per share when the true facts became known."'
' 38
The undeniable power of the stock market and its associated
public scrutiny may indirectly force corporations to exercise
diligence. 139 In addition, the continued scrutiny of both the media and
the courts can enhance corporate accountability and ensure that
improper behavior will not be swept under the rug.140 However, this
indirect deterrence does not absolve courts and legislatures of their
responsibility to preserve strong rights and new remedies for
patients. 141
IV. PROPOSAL FOR NEW REMEDIES
A. New Remedies against Third Party Beneficiaries
Legislatures need to create a cause of action that will allow
patients to recover based on a property interest in organs and cadavers,
not simply for emotional distress caused by their use. The inadequacy
of current remedies necessitates the development of new remedies for
the misappropriation of organs. Lawmakers must develop clearly-
defined remedies to compensate victims. Because of the seemingly
intangible nature and value of human organs and tissue, it is
informative to borrow from the remedial structure of intellectual
property law.
In particular, one option to negotiate adequate compensation for
organs may be borrowed from copyright law. 142 In copyright law,
copyrighted works may be licensed for a fixed compulsory licensing
fee. 143 Thus, in cases where third parties develop technology from
organs, corporations could pay a mandatory licensing fee, based on the
138 See id.
139 See Stone, supra note 128, at 567.
140 See generally Keenan Law Firm, supra note 132; Class Action America Online,
Tulane University Willed Body Program and LSU-Shreveport Willed Body Program,
available at
http://www.classactionamerica.com/public/caselndex.aspx?lngCaseID=3 2 7 3 (last
visited April 27, 2006) (describing a potential lawsuit against the Tulane University
for their mishandling of cadavers); Stone, supra note 128, at 567.
141 See Gitter, supra note 26, at 270.
142 17 U.S.C. § 115.
143 Id.
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kind of technology developed and the organs used. 144  Furthermore,
trademark law also allows plaintiffs to recover a reasonable royalty, i.e.
all or a percentage of the defendant's profits. 4 5 Similar to trademark
law, plaintiffs in organ misappropriation cases could recover against
third party corporate beneficiaries based on the defendant's profits. 1
46
Greater damages would not only sufficiently compensate victims in
more egregious cases, but higher damages may act as a deterrent for
such corporate misconduct. 14 7 Under this scheme, damages could also
take into account the contribution of the patient's organ in the research,
and be apportioned accordingly. 1
48
This policy could be expanded to create banks for legal acquisition
of cell and tissue banks, which could greatly assist the progress of
technology and destroy the need for "black market" acquisition of such
tissue. 149 This transparent and accessible scheme of compensation may
also encourage tissue, cell, and organ donation. 1
50
B. Patent Law Reforms: Adoption of CBD proposals
Patent law has a profound impact upon research and development
because it regulates the manner in which companies may exploit and
develop their technology. '51 Therefore, the USPTO has an ethical
responsibility to the scientific community and the public. 152  It is
144 See Amanda Warren-Jones, Patenting DNA: A Lot Of Controversy Over A Little
Intangibility, 12 MED. L. REv. 97, 124 (2004).
145 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 30:85; 15 U.S.C. § 1117.
146 Warren-Jones, supra note 148, at 100.
147 Cf Goodwin, supra note 61, at 380 ("proscription on cadaver sales or grave
robbing did not deter medical doctors from seeking sources upon which to experiment.
Rather, as in the case of organs, it motivated a private industry.").
148 See Warren-Jones, supra note 148, at 100 (proposing legal relief similar to
copyright licensing).
149 See id. at 124 (proposing clearing houses for genetic information similar to those
used for copyrighted musical works).
150 See Mary Taylor Danforth, Cells, Sales, & Royalties: The Patient's Right to a
Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 179, 195 (1988); Thomas P. Dillon,
Source Compensation for Tissue and Cells Used in Biotechnical Research: Why a
Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits, 64 NOTRE DAME L.REv. 628, 634. (1989);
Goodwin, supra note 61, at 310 (discussing the need for greater transparency in
incentive-based organ donation schemes).
151 See generally Stacy Kincaid, Oh, The Places You'll Go: The Implications of
Current Patent Law on Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 30 PEPP. L. REv. 553
(discussing the impact of patent law on stem cell research).
152 United States v. Line Material, 333 U.S. 287, 320 (1948) ("But however that may
be, the Constitution places the rewards to inventors in a secondary role. It makes the
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important that the USPTO adopt CBD proposals requiring disclosure of
the origin of genetic resources and other biological materials in patent
applications. 1 3 Two policies strongly support this shift: 1) improved
disclosure within the scientific and intellectual property communities;
and 2) increased public confidence and participation in the process of
organ donation. 15
As for the first purpose, the Constitution provides one of the main
principles behind the patent system: the "promotion of the useful arts
and sciences." 155 For this reason, patent applicants must provide
sufficient descriptions in patent applications that fully disclose and
enable an invention. 156  By requiring the disclosure of the origin of
genetic resources and biological materials, a patent applicant would
fully disclose the invention to the public, and further the knowledge of
the scientific community.' 
57
Yet, there must be a system that will allow disclosure of a genetic
resource's origin, while protecting the privacy of the family. One
solution to this problem would be a secure database of cadavers and
organs.158 In the event additional resources or samples are needed for
further research, a database and clearinghouse could also allow
public interest the primary concern in the patent system."); Motion Picture Patents v.
Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) ("this court has consistently held that
the prirhary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the
owners of patents but is 'to promote the progress of science and useful arts....').
153 Nancy Kremers, supra note 94, at 143.
154 See id.
155 U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8.
156 35 U.S.C. § 112.
157 John Edward Schneider, Microorganisms And The Patent Office: To Deposit Or
Not To Deposit, That Is The Question, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 592, 594 ("the
enablement requirement helps fulfill the overall purpose of the Act which is 'To
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts' by encouraging inventors to
share their acquired knowledge with the public."); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, 52 U.S.L.W. 4090, 4093 (1984) ("[t]he purpose of the patent and
copyright laws is to motivate inventors and writers by granting them a limited
monopoly and to allow public access to the products of their genius when the
monopoly expires.")
158 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DRAFT PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE GUIDELINE
ON INFECTIOUS DISEASE ISSUES IN XENOTRANSPLANTATION § 1.3.7, available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/00/backgrd/357lblc.htm (last visited April 27,
2006) [hereinafter XENOTRANSPLANTATION]; see Michelle Locke, UC Considers
Using Barcodes for Cadavers, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory?id=474857 (last visited April 27, 2006)
(after scandals involving the black-market sale of cadavers and organs, the University
of California is considering using barcodes to track cadavers).
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scientists to indirectly contact families, while maintaining patient
privacy. In a similar vein, the USPTO already has a depository of
materials (such as starting materials and biological materials) for
inventions if a patent applicant cannot readily describe how to make the
material. 160 The University of California has already proposed tracking
cadavers by barcode or by radio frequency devices, which would
facilitate an organ and cadaver database. 161 There have also been
proposals for the FDA to track organ donations.'
62
As for the second purpose, this system would make the system of
organ donation far more transparent. 1 3 This transparency may foster
more trust in the public; this element of trust is essential because the
advancement of organ transplantation technology must be a joint
venture between society and the biotechnology sector.
V. CONCLUSION
As research continues to progress, the need for human tissue and
organs will only increase. With these increased needs, greater financial
rewards increase in tandem with the possibilities of fraudulent
acquisition and misappropriation of human tissue. Legislatures and
courts must act now to define an authoritative and cohesive legal
framework that balances patient rights and the requirements of
scientific progress. Failing to change the murky status quo will
undermine the goodwill of the scientific community and unnecessarily
deter legitimate use of human tissue for important research.
As previously discussed, the Regents of University of
California recently expressed interest in putting barcodes on cadavers
to safeguard against further mishandling of cadavers. Undoubtedly, the
comparison to consumer products cannot be avoided: this is indeed
symbolic of the fact that organs and cadavers have become
commodities within the research and scientific communities.
Yet when it comes to our legal framework providing protection
for this most personal of commodities, courts and legislatures provide
only a half-hearted protection of victim's rights. It is especially ironic
that cadavers lose their "personhood" and family rights to essentially
159 Warren-Jones, supra note 148, at 124.
160 37 C.F.R. § 1.801.
161 See Michelle Locke, supra note 162.
162 XENOTRANSPLANTATION, supra note 162 (recommending tracking for organ
donors).
163 id.
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become property in some instances, but have no recognizable property
right when victims of theft and misconduct involving tissue from
cadavers seek remedies. No doubt much of the courts' motivation
revolves around the negative moral and legal implications of treating
organs as property or commodities. However, as we view the woefully
inadequate remedies available for victims of fraudulent acquisition of
organs and tissues, we must ask whether victims or unjust beneficiaries
are benefiting more from a status quo in which a cadaver's only value
is in the sum of its parts.
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